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This study examines the effect of fully- funded graduate
education (FFGE) and Joint Professional Military Education
(JPME) on the performance of Naval Aviation Officers by
examining the Commander (0-5) and Captain (0-6) promotion
results prior to and after the start of the Department of
Defense downsizing. The impact of FFGE and JPME on the
chance of an officer screening for command, another measure
of performance, are also examined. Previous research has
analyzed the effects of these two education opportunities on
performance of all unrestricted line (surface, submarine and
aviation) officers. However, the research has not looked
directly at the aviation community by itself. The career
path of aviation officers is drastically different from the
other line communities and it is expected that the return on
these education opportunities will also be different for
aviators
.
Human capital investment theory implies that the
investment in human capital will increase earnings. "It is
an implication of our investment model of educational choice
that earnings rise with the level of education, for if they
did not, the incentives for students to invest in more
education would disappear." 1 Due to the nature of the
Navy' s compensation system, Naval Officers are unable to
directly realize the impact of more education on earnings.
Naval officers are all payed according to rank. While some
aviators receive bonuses for the type of aircraft they fly,
the way increased productivity in the Navy is rewarded is
through promotion. Therefore, pilots and NFOs with FFGE
and/or JPME should promote at a higher rate than those
without the extra education.
The Navy provides their officers with graduate
education opportunities for several reasons. First and
foremost, the Navy's personnel system is a closed
hierarchical system. Officers start at the lowest rank in
the officer corps and work their way up through a series of
promotions that are based on performance. The Navy has
determined that there are jobs that must be filled with
higher ranking officers with postgraduate education in
certain fields. The officers who must fill these billets
cannot be hired into these important positions from outside
the Navy due to the nature of this closed hierarchical
system. Thus the Navy must provide the education to some of
their officers.
'Ehrenberg, Ronald G. and Smith, Robert S., Modern Labor
Economics, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 1994.
The Navy also provides the opportunity for graduate
education to increase the productivity of their officer
corps. Those officers with FFGE have acquired both general
and firm-specific education. The general education provides
the basis for the firm-specific education. It is this firm-
specific education that qualifies an officer for those
special jobs. Both the general and firm-specific education
enhance the officer's productivity in all future jobs. The
education has provided the tools to analyze and solve
problems encountered on the job using the skills and
techniques acquired in postgraduate school.
The discipline in graduate education of tackling
an original research problem that has no known
right answer; of learning how to frame a question
and how to approach it; of knowing how to
interpret data, how to draw significant
conclusions from them, and how to present and sell
the validity of the result provides an
extraordinarily effective approach to problem
solving that is beneficial throughout a career. 2
The third reason that graduate education is provided is
its value as an incentive to stay in the military. FFGE is
also seen as a benefit for Naval Officers. Selection for
FFGE is based on "outstanding professional performance,
2Naval Studies Board, Technology for the United States Navy
and Marine Corps, 2000-2035, National Academy of Sciences,
1997.
promotion potential and a strong academic background." 3 The
opportunity for FFGE provides those that are selected for
this opportunity with a sense of accomplishment or a psychic
reward for the past performance that earned them the
opportunity. There is also the chance for personal gain in
the future through access to challenging jobs that reguire
postgraduate education or increased earnings upon leaving
the Navy.
Competition among the services for choice joint duty
assignments and the increased demands on the smaller Navy
highlight the need for graduate education. The career paths
of most unrestricted line officers leave little time for
graduate education. The opportunity cost of leaving the
cockpit for aviators or remaining operational for Surface
Warfare Officers is seen as too great a price to pay for
many. There is a difference in the opinion of many senior
leaders in the Navy on the subject of fully- funded graduate
education. While many senior leaders praise the merits of
graduate education there are others who see it as a "non-
operational" community priority.
Despite the value of graduate education for the Navy
and its officer corps, there are changes that have been made
3Director of Admissions, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School Catalog, Academic Year
1998.
in the past several years which have had an impact on an
aviator's ability to receive graduate education. It is
largely due to these factors that the Aviation community
drastically reduced the numbers of aviators it is sending to
the Naval Postgraduate School and other fully-funded
graduate education programs in recent and upcoming years.
The Navy's Fiscal Year 1990 Officer Graduate and
Undergraduate Education Quota Plan allotted 145 billets for
graduate education for the aviation community. 4 By contrast
the Fiscal Year 1998 plan has quotas for only 55 aviators. 5
The smaller Navy of today is asked to do more with
fewer personnel and assets. Joint Vision 2010 demands that
Naval Officers master the complexities of new technologies
and the advantages technology can bring to the battlefield. 6
Investment is hard in times of tight budgets and education
is seen as an investment opportunity. The aviation
community has felt pressure to meet operational demands and
the current solution is to decrease FFGE opportunities for
4Chief of Naval Operations, Fiscal Year 1990 Officer
Graduate and Undergraduate Education Quota Plan, Washington,
DC, September 1989.
5Chief of Naval Operations, Fiscal Year 1998 Officer
Postgraduate Education Quota Plan, Washington, DC, November
1997.
6Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010,
Washington, DC, June 1996.
Naval Aviators.
In 1986 Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) . This law
placed greater emphasis on the importance of joint war
fighting which requires joint education and experience. One
of the objectives of GNA was to ensure that the services
selected quality officers for joint duty. And in order to
ensure that officers were prepared for joint duty,
assignment to those billets now requires completion of Joint
Professional Military Education. Promotion to flag or
general officer requires designation as a Joint Duty
Officer, indicating that the officer has both served in a
joint duty assignment and has completed the necessary
education to perform well in those positions.
The "Aviation Career Improvement Act of 1989" was
enacted primarily to improve the retention of active duty
military aviators. This law changed the requirement for
aviators to remain eligible for flight pay. The law raised
operational flying requirements from six to nine years of
operational flying in the first twelve years of aviation
service. 7 This meant that from the date of starting flight
school an aviator must fill an operational flying or flight
'Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Armed
Services, United States Senate, Aviation Career Improvement
Act, April 1989.
training billet for nine of the next twelve years in the
Navy. In doing so, the Navy would be able to protect its
investment in the training of aviators as well as minimizing
the costs associated with maintaining flying proficiency and
combat skills. It is obviously very expensive and time-
consuming to train an aviator. If that aviator leaves the
service as soon as he is eligible, chances are very good
that the Navy will not have maximized its return on the
investment in training. One of the "tools" the military
uses to retain aviators is the policy of aviation career
incentive pay (ACIP) or "flight pay".
All aviators receive ACIP beginning on the date they
actually enter flight training and throughout their military
careers as long as they remain physically qualified to fly
and they meet the minimum requirements as prescribed by
military regulations. The monetary amount of ACIP varies by
years of flying service and currently ranges from a minimum
of $125 to a maximum of $650 a month for "Phase I" ACIP.
It was not until 1995 that the "required" disassociated sea
tour became eligible for a waiver to meet these flight
requirements. These disassociated sea tours have become an
unofficial requirement for all aviators. Aviation community
leaders have deemed it necessary for junior aviators to go
to sea as part of the ship's crew or on deploying staffs.
This requirement ensures that the aviation community has
enough shipboard qualified aviators to serve in leadership
positions on major aviation capable ships. Thus, prior to
1995 the 18-24 months required of the FFGE program plus a
disassociated sea tour could result in a $650 per month loss
of pay. Since the 1995 waiver of the disassociated sea
tour, aviators can receive FFGE and have disassociated sea
tours without the fear of losing flight pay.
In 1989 the Navy also started a major downsizing that
is just now coming to an end. The new requirements mentioned
above and the downsizing have placed an ever changing
emphasis on what is a priority for the Aviation community.
Because of the varied and competing requirements placed on
aviators careers it is important that the investment in
education and the impact it has on aviator' s careers be
measured so that the Navy can determine if it is placing the
correct amount of emphasis on education.
This study examines the effect of FFGE and JPME on
performance by examining the 0-5 and 0-6 promotion results
prior to and after the start of the Department of Defense
downsizing. In addition, the study compares these results
with an analysis that includes the assignment to "good jobs"
in a squadron as an additional performance measure. Data
are compiled from the 0-5 and 0-6 Promotion History Files,
Officer Master Files, and Fitrep Files.
The important questions investigated are:
How do fully-funded graduate education and
resident Joint Professional Military Education impact the
probability of promotion to 0-5 and 0-6 in the Aviation
community?
Have the effects of fully-funded graduate
education and resident Joint Professional Military Education
changed since the start of the downsizing?
Is there a difference in the effects of having
either fully-funded graduate education or resident Joint
Professional Military Education compared with officers who
have both educational experiences?
This thesis attempts incorporates new measures of
performance not used in previous studies. Incorporating the
variables for assignment to the "good jobs" in a squadron
will help to control for traits that are not easily
measured. It is commonly known that the best officers in a
squadron are assigned the most challenging and important
jobs. These officers may have identical grades on their
fitness reports as others, however they may have traits or
abilities that make them stand out, but are not graded by
fitness reports. This thesis attempts to control for these
traits by including "good jobs" in the models. The
reasoning behind this approach is that only one person can
have the "good job" at a time while many people can have
identical FITREP grades. This should help control for
traits like drive and desire. These good jobs include
Operations Officer (OPSO) , Maintenance Officer (MO)
,
Quality
Assurance Officer (QAO) , Flight Officer (FLTO) and billets
as instructors in the Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS)
.
The OPSO and MO jobs are the most important jobs in the
squadron at the department head level . The QAO, FLTO and
FRS jobs are some of the most demanding jobs for division
officers
.
This thesis examines the impact of GNA and the
downsizing on officer promotion. The value of FFGE and JPME
will be determined by quantifying the impact of resident
JPME and FFGE on promotion. This will determine if the Navy
is putting the right emphasis on the investment in
education.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis examines the careers of pilots and naval
flight officers (NFOs)up to their 0-5 and 0-6 promotion
boards
.
This study uses merged data files of officers having
1310 (pilot) and 1320 (NFO) designators used in previous
10
studies by Walsh 8 and Kovach. 9 These data files include the
0-5 and 0-6 promotion boards files from 1981-1994 and
FITREP/UIC (Unit Identification Code) files of the
individual officers. These data sets contain the
demographic, performance, education and job history for all
aviation officers who were considered for promotion. The
promotion files also include the results of the promotion
boards. Two separate models are analyzed to determine if
there has been a shift in the importance of FFGE and
Resident JPME
.
As indicated above, the analysis incorporates some new
measures of performance to isolate the impact of FFGE and
JPME. Specifically, dummy variables for the "good jobs"
will be included to measure the differences in performance
not captured in previous studies. This will help control
for performance since many officers receive good FITREPs but
very few can have the "good jobs". Using this in
conjunction with previously designated measures of
performance will further define the model and better
estimate the impact of FFGE and JPME.
Walsh, Daniel J., "Joint Professional Military Education
and its Effects on the Unrestricted Line Naval Officer
Career," Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March
1997.
9Kovach, John P., "An Analysis of Naval Officers Serving on
Joint Duty: The Impact of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act,"
Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 1996.
11
It is true that promotion is a function of
performance. Previous studies include demographics and
prior experience as factors that also need to be included in
any performance or promotion model. Variables like desire
and drive that cannot be measured will be estimated by using
proxies. Performance on FITREPs, undergraduate GPA,
undergraduate major and FITREP information should be good
estimates of those unmeasurable traits.
The purpose of this study is to determine whether the
Navy values FFGE, utilization of the degree, resident JPME
and joint duty assignment for its Aviation community
officers. This study will also determine if GNA and the
drawdown have changed the Navy's priorities. Knowing what
assignments are career enhancing will enable aviation
officers to plan their careers and future assignments with a
sense of the direction the Navy has taken since the start of
the drawdown.
The study is limited to the Aviation community to more
accurately measure the value of these educational
opportunities for officers with very similar career paths.
The different aviation sub-communities (helicopter, tactical
and prop) will not be analyzed independently due to the
small numbers of observations available in the data sets.
12
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study is organized in five chapters. Chapter II
reviews previous studies in this area of research and
summarizes the Navy's FFGE and JPME programs. Chapter III
describes the data sets used in the study and explains the
models used to measure the effects of FFGE and JPME.
Chapter IV presents the results of the different regression
models with a comparison of the models using "good jobs" as
an estimation of performance and other unmeasurable traits.
Chapter V summarizes the results, makes recommendations for
further areas of research and provides conclusions about the




II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND
This section reviews Human Capital Investment Theory,
the Navy's Fully- Funded Graduate Education program, the
Resident Joint Professional Military Education program and
some previous studies related to this thesis.
A. HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT THEORY
Naval Officers have two significant opportunities for
education that constitute time away from their primary
duties. The Navy offers an opportunity for Fully-Funded
Graduate Education for all qualified officers and Resident
Joint Professional Military Education for Lieutenant
Commanders (0-4) and above. Naval Aviators that opt for
these education benefits are paid full salaries and do not
incur any significant monetary costs.
However, the non-monetary costs to the officers of
these education opportunities include:
1. Opportunities to remain in operational flying
billets. This could cause loss of flight pay if an
individual has opted for other non-flying billets.
2. Exposure to warfare community where experience and
reputation are important for advancement and consideration
for the good community jobs.
15
3. "Psychic costs" 10 of moving to a new location and
having to become a student again. These education
opportunities normally present themselves years after
graduation from undergraduate school. The stress of being
put in the role of a student, in many cases after being an
instructor, can be very great.
There are no significant out-of-pocket, direct expenses
or foregone earnings. For the purposes of this thesis, the
costs to the officer for these two educational opportunities
are the same except for the time involved.
Earning a graduate degree through the FFGE option takes
between 18 and 24 months. The Resident JPME Phase I takes
10 to 12 months and Phase II takes about 3 months. Some
officers are able to complete both Phase I and II in one 12
month program.
JPME requires less of an investment of time when the
time available is limited. This is especially true for
aviators. The requirements to fill billets in disassociated
sea tours, Navy staff positions, joint jobs and normal
flying billets leaves very little time for full time
education. An aviator's career path is also very
constricted due to the long training time involved in basic
10Ehrenberg, Ronald G. and Smith, Robert S., Modern Labor
Economics, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 1994.
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flight training, advanced training, Fleet Replacement
Squadron ( FRS ) training. FRS training is required after any
tour in which an aviator's qualifications have expired.
This time limit is a maximum of one year away from flying.
Thus both resident JPME Phase I and FFGE require the
aviators to spend extra time away from the fleet while in
the FRS.
JPME is not available to officers until selection to
0-4 (approximately 10 years of service) . JPME is seen as
having less of an opportunity cost and no negative impact on
an aviator's career. The officer's community reputation has
already been established and they have successfully selected
to 0-4. It is at this point that an officer is allowed to
stay until retirement without any further promotions. The
officers have little to lose if they attend JPME. They also
have the opportunity to be considered for assignment to some
very important and interesting joint duty assignments that
are still operational in nature.
FFGE is available to aviators after their first
operational flying tour (approximately 5 years of service)
.
However, some aviators are advised against attending FFGE in
favor of staying competitive by remaining operational.
Aviation community leaders know that an officers'
reputations are made early in their career and that
17
community reputation is very important. This means staying
in jobs where they are being evaluated against others in
their community.
FFGE consists of both general education which is
applicable to many jobs and specific education designed to
prepare the officer for a subspecialty. This subspecialty
education enables the officer to perform specialized jobs.
These jobs have been designated to be filled by officers
with the proper education. 11
Human capital investment theory states that the" [cost
of] specific training, training of use only to one's
employer, is shared by the worker and the firm. In the case
of general training, in which employees acquire skills
usable elsewhere, they alone pay the training costs." 12
This does not apply to FFGE and JPME . The Navy pays all the
costs for both general and specific education. FFGE is both
general and firm-specific while JPME is more firm-specific
in nature
.
This may be a factor in how the Navy "rewards" those
people with the additional education. These people are
eligible for special jobs and acquire special
"Bureau of Naval Personnel (PERS-213), Officer Subspecialty
System Handbook , January 1993.
12Ibid, p. 298.
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qualifications. While JPME is required by law for
assiqnment to joint billets, FFGE is required by Navy
requlations for assignment to sub-specialty jobs. Aviators
with FFGE and/or JPME may be rewarded for their investment
in education by promoting at different rates. These higher
promotion rates could also be related to the increased
performance of those officers with more education. This
education may have improved the officer' s analytical
abilities, efficiency or provided new insight on common
organizational problems. All of these reasons may impact
promotions and enable the Navy to recoup some of their
investment costs.
B. FULLY-FUNDED GRADUATE EDUCATION
FFGE can be obtained from the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) and through the Navy's Civilian Institutions program.
The officers that utilize these opportunities earn Master's
degrees in approved programs. These programs give the
officers who attend the general and specific education
necessary to perform key jobs in the future. At the
completion of their education they are assigned subspecialty
codes. These codes were "developed as a means to define the
graduate education requirements for the Navy". 13 NPS is the
13 Ibid,
19
primary source of FFGE for the Navy. 14
C. RESIDENT JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
Senior level Resident JPME Phase I and II training is
available at the National War College or the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces. The other options for senior
level training are taught in two phases. Resident Senior
level Phase I is taught at the Air War College, Army War
College, College of Naval Warfare and Marine Corps War
College. Senior level Phase I credit can also be obtained
through fellowships (until 1999) and foreign military
schools. Resident Senior level Phase II is taught at the
Armed Forces Staff College. 15
Resident JPME Phase I is available at the intermediate
level (0-4 & 0-5) at the Air Command and Staff College, Army
Command and General Staff College, College of Naval Command
and Staff, Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the
Naval Postgraduate School (National Security Affairs Program
only) . Intermediate level Phase I training was also
available at foreign military schools and through some
fellowships (until 1997) . Resident JPME Phase II is only
14See Fuchs [Ref. 5] for a complete summary of the Navy's
fully-funded graduate education program.
15Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional
Military Education Policy , 1996.
20
available at the Armed Forces Staff College. 16 Currently
there are no institutions where both Phase I and Phase II is
taught. Prior to 1990 the Armed Forces Staff College
provided Phase I and II training. 17
D. PREVIOUS STUDIES
Previous studies using the same data sets were
conducted by Dr. William R. Bowman [Ref 3], Daniel J. Walsh
[Ref 2], John P. Kovach [Ref 1] and Kim L. Fuchs [Ref 5].
1. Walsh
This thesis, titled "Joint Professional Military
Education and its Effects on the Unrestricted Line Naval
Officer Career," analyzes the impact of JPME on 0-4, 0-5 and
0-6 promotion outcomes from 1986 to 1994. The study uses a
Logit nonlinear model to measure the different factors
affecting promotion. Estimates from the models are
interpreted using the notional person technique "to
determine differences between marginal probabilities of
promotion resulting from the differing effects of JPME
across communities." 18
16Ibid.
17See Walsh [Ref 2] for a complete history and summary of the
military's Joint Professional Military Education program.
18Walsh, Daniel J., "Joint Professional Military Education
and its Effects on the Unrestricted Line Naval Officer,"
Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 1997.
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The study contains an extensive review of the history
of JPME, previous related studies, and human capital
investment theory. The research indicates that, of all the
services, the Navy has given the lowest priority to JPME.
The Army and Air Force have 100 percent completion rates for
JPME amongst their General Officers while the Marine Corps
has a rate of over 90 percent completion. In contrast, the
Navy has less than 30 percent JPME completion rate amongst
their Flag Officers. 19
The career paths of the different communities in the
Unrestricted Line (URL) and the Navy' s approach to JPME are
also presented.
Walsh equates performance with promotion. This is a
reasonable assumption since the system is designed such that
people who perform better promote at higher rates. His
models estimate the effects all methods of earning JPME
Phase I and II credit on all URL communities. This assumes
that these returns are the same for all URL communities.
This may not be an accurate assumption as is indicated by
the three different career paths discussed in the background
section of the study. The career paths in the different
communities have special priorities and requirements and
JPME and FFGE may not have the same value in the different
19 Ibid.
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communities. For example the submarine community places
great emphasis on technical training and education. It can
be expected that the value of a technical graduate degree
will be greater in the submarine community. It would be
inappropriate to assume this variable would have the same
significance in the surface and aviation communities. The
same can be said of variables like technical undergraduate
major, graduate education, utilization of subspecialty
school education, JPME and joint duty assignments.
The possibility of different returns towards promotion
is accounted for by including dummy variables for each
community. These dummy variables provide an estimate for
the overall difference by community but will not help in the
estimation of the individual variables in the promotion
models
.
The findings indicate that resident JPME increases the
chance of promotion to 0-6 only. URL officers completing
graduate education prior to the 0-5 promotion board increase
their chances for promotion to 0-5 only.
2 . Kovach
This thesis, titled "An Analysis of Naval Officers
Serving on Joint Duty: The Impact of the 1986 Goldwater-
23
Nichols Act"20 examines the changes in the quality of
officers assigned to joint duty and the effect joint duty
has on their careers. The models in this study estimate the
impact on promotion to 0-4, 0-5 and 0-6. The extremely
small number of 0-3 's with JPME makes the 0-4 promotion
model inappropriate. There are enough observations in the
data set for the 0-5 and 0-6 promotion models.
Each promotion model is subdivided by time. One model
is specified for promotions before and one for after FY
1990. The results of the pre-FY 1990 models indicate that
those people with JPME are better performers than the
average person but not better performers than the post-FY
1990 individuals with JPME. The post-FY 1990 model
indicates better performance of officers with JPME than both
the average officer and the pre-FY 1990 individuals with
JPME. This model specification divided by time is
important. The impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the
Navy's downsizing are both seen in this model.
Kovach' s study failed to analyze the effects of JPME on
aviator Commanding Officer/Executive Officer selection due
to a problem with the coding of the data set. This is an
area that would be of interest for future research. The
20Kovach, John P., "An Analysis of Naval Officers Serving on
Joint Duty: The Impact of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act,"
Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 1996.
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aviation community places great emphasis on operational
tours and may reward those that have stayed operational with
an increased chance for command. In this case FFGE may
negatively impact screening for command. JPME may have
little or no effect since in many cases resident JPME occurs
after the command screening board. This result would be
consistent with Walsh's study since JPME opportunities
normally occur after the 0-5 and command screen boards.
3 . Bowman
Another study titled "Career Progression of line
officers and Graduate Education in the U.S. Navy"21
conducted by Dr. William Bowman of the U.S. Naval Academy
included JPME. Its primary focus however was the impact of
graduate education on performance. The study used several
PROBIT models for each URL community. This method gives
more accurate estimations of the effects of different
education opportunities on promotion.
The study found that pilots that attend FFGE are more
likely to promote to 0-5. Those pilots that earn non-
technical graduate degrees promote at even higher rates.
FFGE was found to increase promotion opportunities to 0-6
especially if the degree was either utilized as an 0-4 or
21Bowman, William R., Career Progression of Line Officers
and Graduate Education in the U.S. Navy, Department of
Economics, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, September 1996
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never utilized. Using the degree as an 0-5 results in
promotion rates that are the same as those officers without
FFGE. Pilots with technical graduate degrees that utilize
these degrees promote a rate of 15-30 percentage points
lower than those without FFGE.
NFOs were found in general to have lower opportunities
for promotion than other URL officers. Those with FFGE
promote at a slightly higher rate. One interesting result
is that those that utilize their graduate education prior to
the 0-5 board promote at a 10-15 percentage point lower rate
than those who have not used their education. This is a
lower promotion rate than those without FFGE. Of the NFOs
with FFGE, those who have never utilized their degree
promote at the highest rate among other NFOs. Those NFOs
that do not utilize their degrees probably fill key
community positions. Their selection to these "good jobs"
is most likely based on performance and that may factor in
their higher promotion rates.
The results indicate that NFOs are penalized for using
their FFGE while pilots can utilize their degrees as 0-5'
s
without hurting their chances of promotion.
4 . Talaga
This thesis analyzes the "Impact of the Navy's fully-
funded graduate education (FFGE) program on Surface Warfare
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Officer performance." 22 The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
is used as a synonym for FFGE since 96% of FFGE for URL
Officers is conducted at NPS. The measures of performance
used are probability of promotion to 0-4, percent of all LT
FITREPs recommended for early promotion, and the probability
of receiving an early promotion recommendation on the last
Lieutenant FITREP.
The author includes an extensive literature review of
research in the areas of human capital investment theory,
personnel promotion, FITREPs, and selectivity bias. The
research in all these areas was more than satisfactory and
appropriate to the thesis. The performance measures
identified for FITREPs showed a very realistic appreciation
of how the previous FITREP system worked and the
shortcomings of that system.
The existence of possible selectivity bias is
identified. The author goes through extensive measures to
control for this bias. The "Heckman" and "Barnow" methods
are both employed to identify the existence of and correct
for any bias. The findings show that selectivity does not
bias the estimates of fully-funded graduate education in the
22Talaga, Michael T., "An Econometric Analysis of the Effect
of Fully-Funded Graduate Education on Performance for Surface
Warfare Officers," Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
March 1994.
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performance models used in the thesis.
The results of the regression models showed that FFGE
was a highly significant and positive factor in promotion to
0-4. The value of FFGE was not as large as LT FITREP
performance and Department Head School attendance. FFGE is
not a statistically significant factor in receiving early
promotion recommendations on all LT FITREPs including the
one prior to the promotion board.
The analysis of the impact of FFGE on Surface Warfare
Officer (SWO) performance was designed as a tool to help
prove that FFGE serves a useful purpose. The hypothesis is
that FFGE increases productivity in the officers that earn
masters degrees.
The goal of the thesis was to measure the impact of NPS
on SWO performance. The expectation is that human capital
investment theory is correct in this application. The
author predicts that FFGE will improve performance. The
design of the study follows the same format and functional
form as previous research studies in human capital
investment theory.
The true measure of FFGE would show how NPS improved
the performance of individual students that attended the
institution. The true measure of the impact of NPS on
performance requires a comparison of relative performance
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before and after NPS attendance. Did the student "get
better"? If a SWO' s performance, relative to their peers
and all other factors being equal, improves after receiving
FFGE then these results indicate a true positive return to
FFGE.
The true payoff for graduate education does not
generally take place prior to the 0-4 selection board in
most SWO' s careers. The SWO career path requires them to go
to sea duty following NPS. They do not have a chance to
"pay back" their education for two to three years following
graduation. The study could have also used the information
in the literature review and followed the lines of the
Cymrot study and looked at promotion to 0-5 and 0-6. 23
5 . Fuchs
This thesis is titled "The Effects of the Utilization
of Graduate Education on Promotion and Executive
Officer/Command Screening in the Surface Community: 1986 -
1994 24 " and is authored by LT Kim L. Fuchs. LT Fuchs
analyzed the effect of graduate education on job performance
of Surface Warfare Officers. In addition to obtaining the
23Cymrot, Donald J., "Graduate Education and the promotion of
Officers," Center for Naval Analysis, March 1986.
24Fuchs, Kim L., "The Effects of the Utilization of Graduate
Education on Promotion and Executive Officer/Command Screening
in the Surface Community: 1986-1994," Master's Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, March 1996.
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advanced degree, Fuchs examined the impact of utilization of
the degree on performance. Technical versus non-technical
degree effects on performance were compared and examined.
LT Fuchs reviewed both civilian and military studies on
the effects of graduate education. The key military study
cited was a 1995 study conducted by LT Fuchs' advisors,
Mehay and Bowman. The author tied the 1995 study into his
research by redefining the variable for successful officer
performance. Fuchs uniquely defines performance as
successful XO screen, CO screen and promotion to 0-6 instead
of using 0-4 promotion as a criteria of successful
performance. This was innovative because the XO/CO screen
assumes promotion to 0-4 and 0-5. Performance becomes a
joint outcome of successful promotion and XO/CO screen.
The results of the probit models showed that the
graduate education and fully funded graduate education
variables were both positive and significant for XO screen,
CO screen and promotion to 0-6. There was, however,
selection bias in the XO screen variable. Though the author
could not correct for this, the study did identify the
presence and direction of the bias.
Neither technical nor non-technical education variables
were significant for the XO screen. Both technical and non-
technical education variables were significant and positive
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with respect to the CO screen and 0-6 promotion. Non-
technical degrees had more of an impact on CO screen and 0-6
promotion than technical degrees.
It was also determined that utilization of the sub-
specialties benefitted those who performed pay back tours
after their XO tours.
A key aspect of this study is LT Fuchs' selection of
XO/CO screen as a more accurate measure of performance.
Prior studies have looked for an earlier return on
investment. LT Fuchs' model allows us to observe the
presence of a return further downstream in an officer's
career progression.
The data set of observations from the Navy' s Officer
Promotion History Files and Fitness Report Files covered
1986 through 1994. The author correctly realized this time
frame included the initial stages of personnel downsizing.
Fiscal year dummy variables were used in the model to
account for this. They were found to be insignificant and
were subsequently deleted from the model.
The model used a building block approach which allowed
the author to progressively place controls in the formula.
This was effective, though an individual's desire and will
to succeed is still absent from the list of variables. The
author made an attempt to control for this by including a
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variable RAPPED for those officers that were recommended for
accelerated promotion. This variable originates early in an
officer's career and may still not be representative of the
characteristics desired in order to be screened for command.
Though the use of the joint screen/promotion was new in
examining officer performance, the model itself followed the
same functional form as previous studies.
The selection bias that existed at the XO screen level
was found to be absent at the CO screen point. This may be
explained by the thoroughness of the selection process of
the XO board. Those who are successful beyond this level
tend to be a more homogeneous group of SWOs . If this group
is in fact homogeneous we would expect to see very little or
no selection bias at the CO screen and 0-6 promotion. LT
Fuchs' findings support his conclusion. Fuchs does
recommend the use of a bivariate probit model or
instrumental variable techniques as a control for selection
bias .
Fuchs makes the assumption that the graduate education
received by Surface Warfare Officers is firm-specific in his
human capital model. This firm-specificity will have the
affect of increasing officer productivity and job tenure.
In reality the curricula at the Naval Postgraduate School
includes a balanced format of general education and Navy
32
specific applications. It is this author's opinion that the
Navy's fully- funded graduate education takes more general
and certainly less firm-specific than LT Fuchs asserts.
The statistical analysis of the data in Fuchs' study
also reveals a greater return on investment if graduate
degrees are utilized after the XO screen process.
His study defined performance of a SWO as success in
the joint outcome of XO screen/0-4 promotion and CO
screen/0-5 promotion. This unique method used to measure
performance was insightful and accurate. Fuchs fully
understood the old FITREP system. FITREPs were only used if
they were competitive (rated with other officers in the
command) and based on "close" observation. The author
identified the grade inflation common to the old FITREP
system and chose to use the areas that Commanding Officer's
really employ to "break out" the top performers. This gave
the best indication of true performance.
The author also chose to examine only the SWO
community. This was an excellent choice for all the reasons
stated in the thesis. The community an officer serves in
has an important effect on where the top performers go for
the best duty assignments. Including other communities in
this study would have biased the results.
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E. SUMMARY
This study builds upon the Walsh study by focusing
specifically on the aviation community. It uses new
measures of performance by looking at how assignment to
"good jobs" affects promotion. As in the Kovach study, this
thesis uses two models to measure the impact on promotion
pre-FY 1990 and post-FY 1990 to determine if the drawdown
has changed the Navy's priorities. The effects of FFGE and
JPME on screening for command that Kovach was unable to
accomplish will be measured. The effects of FFGE and JPME
are measured as in the Bowman study with equal emphasis
being placed on both education opportunities. The methods
utilized in the Talaga and Fuchs studies with regard to
using only competitive FITREPS and focusing on only one
community are carried over into this thesis. The lessons
learned from this study will provide insights into the
career progression of aviation community officers and the
priorities of the aviation community.
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter provides the background and sources for
the data used in this study. It also describes the
methodology used in the analysis of the data.
A. DATA SET DESCRIPTION
1. CDR (0-5) Promotion Data Set
This study evaluating the effects of JPME and FFGE uses
two promotion data sets. The 0-5 and 0-6 promotion history
files from Fiscal Year 1986 to 1994, provided by the Bureau
of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) , have been merged with a data set
containing FITREP information provided by the Naval
Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) . These
data sets were originally constructed for a study by Dr.
William R. Bowman. 25
The data sets analyzed were limited to the 0-5 and 0-6
promotion board results due to the small numbers of officers
that earn JPME credit prior to selection to 0-4. The data
was further limited to include only pilots and NFOs to more
accurately measure the impact these two educational
opportunities have in the aviation community. Pilots and
NFOs also have very similar training paths and career
requirements which differ significantly from other Navy
25Bowman, William R., "Career Progression of Line Officers
and Graduate Education in the U.S. Navy," Department of
Economics, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, September 1996
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communities. This was another reason for limiting the study
to the aviation community.
The 0-5 Data set contains 3586 total observations. The
pre- FY 1990 data set for promotion to 0-5 contains 2116
observations and represents the pre-drawdown period. The
post-FY 1990 data set for 0-5 promotion includes 1886
observations and represents the post-drawdown Goldwater-
Nichols era. The 2116 pre-FY90 plus the 1886 post-FY90
observations total 4002 observations. This is 416 more than
the total observations and the difference represents the 416
officers whose records were reviewed at boards both pre-FY90
and post-FY90. This is possible because every officer is
considered three times for promotion. These three looks are
called below-zone (early), in-zone (normal), and above-zone
(late) . Most of the promotions at a promotion board occur
in-zone. In fact, officers are not considered as failing to
select until they have been considered "in-zone" for
promotion.
Table 3.1 provides a summary of those aviators
appearing before these 0-5 boards. In general, it appears
that those aviators with better undergraduate grades choose
FFGE . The aviators that are selected for JPME are better
performers and have been rewarded for this performance with
the good division officer and department head jobs. The
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table shows the average age at commissioning (AGEOl)for
aviators appearing before the 0-5 board is lower than the
average aviator with FFGE and higher than the average
aviator with JPME . Aviators with FFGE are more often
married than the average aviator. Aviators with FFGE have
significantly better undergraduate performance (APCl)than
the average aviator and the aviator with JPME. A definition
of APC1 is provided in Table 3.3. In general, the lower the
APC1 value the higher the undergraduate Qaulity Point Rating
(QPR)
.











AGEOl 22. 948 3574 23 614 22.819 364
MARRIED 0.893 3586 0.901 617 0. 885 365
APC1 2.447 3551 2. 195 614 2.541 360
RAPPED4 0.977 3586 0.964 617 0.995 365
GOODDO 0.172 3586 0.149 617 0. 192 365
GOODDH 0. 06 3586 0.057 617 0.066 365
PIL 0.562 3586 0.47 617 0.523 365
FFGE 0.172 3586 1 617 0.044 365
JPME 0.101 3586 0.026 617 1 365
Aviators with JPME have better FITREP grades
(RAPPED4) than the average aviator and aviators with FFGE
have grades slightly lower than the average. Aviators that
attend FFGE as 0-4s have fewer opportunities to earn a
FITREP that recommends them for early promotion. Aviators
with JPME also have had more "good jobs" than the average
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and aviators with FFGE have had fewer "good jobs" than the
average. This holds true for both good division officer
jobs (GOODDO) and good department head jobs (GOODDH)
.
Pilots (PIL)are more likely to attend JPME than FFGE.
Very few aviators have both FFGE and JPME. This confirms
what has already been discussed. The many constraints on
Aviators careers provides very few opportunities for more
education.
2. CAPT (0-6) and Command Screen Data Sets
The 0-6 promotion data set was broken down in a similar
way with pre-FY 1990 and post-FY 1990 data sets created.
The only change was that this data set was first used to
determine which aviators had screened for command. Previous
studies had been unable to capture these results due to the
coding of the data. Using Naval Officer Billet Codes
(NOBC) , those aviators with NOBC codes that matched the
Commanding Officer code were given a value of 1 for command.
Those officers that did not have the NOBC for Commanding
Officer were given a value of 0. As discussed later in this
thesis, this command variable is used as the dependent
variable in the regression analysis to determine the effects
on command selection. A separate model for 0-6 promotion is
then estimated with command selection as the key variable.
The command and 0-6 promotion data sets have 2265
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observations. The pre-FY90 data sets have 1172 observations
and the post-FY90 data sets have 1370 observations. The
pre-FY90 and post-FY90 data sets do not equal the combined
data set for the same reason stated in the 0-5 promotion
data set section.
Table 3.2 shows the mean proportions for all aviators,
those with FFGE and JPME . The numbers indicate, as in the
0-5 data set, that officers with JPME are screened more
thoroughly for on the job performance and those with FFGE
are screened for undergraduate school performance. Table
3.2 also provides a profile of these different groups.
Aviators with JPME are slightly older at commissioning than
the average and older than those aviators with FFGE.
Aviators with JPME are more often married than those with
FFGE. Both groups are more often married than the average
aviator. Aviators with FFGE have better undergraduate
grades (APCl)than the average aviator and those with JPME.
Aviators with JPME have lower undergraduate QPRs than those
with FFGE and the average aviator.
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AGE 22.523 2256 22.378 415 22.525 570
MARRIED 0.942 2265 0.952 416 0.962 572
APC1 2.698 1964 2.305 315 2.79 504
RAPPED4 0.622 2265 0.565 416 0.652 572
RAPPED5 0.643 2265 0.596 416 0.673 572
GOODDO 0.102 2265 0.079 416 0.107 572
GOODDH 0.261 2265 0.214 416 0.25 572
COMMAND 0.521 2265 0.459 416 0.68 572
PIL 0.697 2265 0.647 416 0.738 572
FFGE 0.184 2265 1 416 0.121 572
JR JPME 0.128 2265 0.067 416 0.507 572
SR JPME 0.132 2265 0.099 416 0.523 572
Aviators with JPME have. better performance as 0-4s
(RAPPED4) and 0-5s (FAPPED5) than the average aviator while
those with FFGE have poorer FITREPs than the average aviator
as indicated by the RAPPED4 and RAPPED5 means. This may
indicate that those aviators who are less single mindedly
committed towards an exclusive flying career and more
oriented toward a variegated naval career opt for FFGE in
hopes of a better job match. Aviators with JPME have had
good division officer jobs (GOODDO)more often than the
average aviator. Aviators with FFGE are the least likely to
have had good division officer jobs. The average aviator
was more likely to have had a good department head job
(GOODDH) than those aviators with JPME or FFGE. Aviators
with JPME are a close second to the average aviator.
Pilots (PIL) are much more likely to attend JPME than
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FFGE . Career constraints, leading up to the 0-6 promotion
board, leave very little time to attend FFGE and JPME . The
career demands placed on aviators has created a system in
which having FFGE and JPME is very difficult.
B. MODELS
1 . CDR Data Set
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the impact of
FFGE and JPME on an aviator's promotion to 0-5, 0-6 and
command selection. Figure 3.1 depicts those variables that
influence promotion to Commander. FFGE and JPME are coded to
only include those officers who attended these programs on a
full-time basis. Those officers who earned their master's
degree through the Naval Postgraduate School or through the
civilian institution program are included in the FFGE group.
Those officers who received JPME education through resident
programs are included in the group with Resident JPME. FFGE
rather than any graduate education is included in the
promotion model because it represents a large monetary
investment in education on the part of the Navy and the
investment of time for the individual officer. Similarly,
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Figure 3.1 CDR Promotion Model
Utilization of these education programs was also
originally included in the model. However, utilization of
FFGE caused multicollinearity problems, and was subsequently
eliminated from consideration. Utilization of JPME was
included in the model. This utilization was determined by
whether or not the individual officer had filled a joint
duty billet as indicated by Additional Qualification
Designators (AQDs)
.
Demographic information is also included in the model
to control for an officer's background. Marital status
(MARRIED), age at commissioning (AGE01) and undergraduate




Performance also needs to be included in the model and
a way to measure this is through an officer's FITREPS. The
most important performance factor for aviators at the 0-5
promotion board is performance as a department head. To
account for this the variable RAPPED4 was developed.
RAPPED4 is a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if
an officer is recommended for early promotion on a
competitive FITREP. A FITREP is considered competitive if
an officer is rated amongst peers. FITREPS given upon
transfer or not observed FITREPS are excluded from
consideration. If the officer was not recommended for early
promotion on any competitive FITREPs they were assigned a
value of 0. To capture any differences in performance not
captured in the demographics or FITREP measures, variables
for "good jobs" were developed.
"Good jobs" are broken down into good division officer
jobs and good department head jobs. Good division officer
jobs include Quality Assurance Officer, Flight Officer and
RAG instructor. If the officer had ever filled one of these
billets they were considered as having a good division
officer job and GOODDO was set equal to 1, otherwise it was
set equal to 0. The variable GOODDH was developed in a
similar way. If the officer had ever filled a billet as the
Maintenance Officer or Operations Officer in a squadron they
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were considered as having a good department head job and
GOODDH was set equal to 1, otherwise it was set equal to 0.
To account for the differences in pilots and NFOs a
dummy variable was included. The variable PIL is set equal
to 1 if the officer was a pilot and if the officer was a
NFO. Table 3.3 provides a summary of the variables and
their description.
Table 3.3 CDR Promotion Model Variable Name and Description
VARIABLE
NAME DESCRIPTION
AGE 01 Age in years at commissioning
MARRIED l=Married
0=Not married
APC1 0=College QPR of 3.60-4.0
l=College QPR of 3.20-3.59
2=College QPR of 2.60-3.19
3=College QPR of 2.20-2.59
4=College QPR of 1.90-2.19
5=College QPR of 0-1.89
RAPPED4 l=Recommended for Early Promotion as a LCDR
0=Not recommended for Early Promotion as a LCDR
FFUNDGE l=Received Fully-funded graduate education
0=Did not receive Fully-funded graduate education
JRIRES l=Received Junior Resident JPME education
0=Did not receive Junior Resident JPME education
JDA l=Filled billet from Joint Duty list
0=Did not fill billet from Joint Duty list
PIL l=Pilot
0=NFO
GOODDO l=Filled a "good" Division Officer billet
0=Did not fill a "good" Division Officer billet
GOODDH l=Filled a "good" Department Head billet
0=Did not fill a "good" Department Head billet
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The final model specification was as follows:
PROMOTE = b + B1*MARRIED + B2*AGE01 + B3*APC1 +
B4*RAPPED4 + B5*FFGE + B6*JPME + B7*JDA +
B8*GOODDO + B9*GOODDH + BIO* PILOT
This specification is used for the overall promotion model
and also for the pre-FY90 and post-FY90 models.
2 . CAPT and Command Data Set
The 0-6 data set variables were constructed in the same
way as the 0-5 data set with one major exception. The
variable command explained so much of the variation
associated with being promoted to 0-6 that a separate model
was developed to identify both the direct and indirect
effects of variables on promotion to 0-6. The interactions
of these two models is shown in Figure 3.2. In order to
determine what affects command screen, a model was specified
with the same variables as the 0-5 promotion model. The
following represents the command model:
COMMAND = Jb + B1*MARRIED + B2*AGE01 + B3*APC1 +
B4*RAPPED4 + B5*FFGE + B6*JRIRES + B7*JDA +
BS*GOODDO + BP*GOODDH + B10*PILOT
The other difference is that JPME has been further specified
to identify the Junior (JRIRES)and Senior Resident courses
(SRIRES)
.
JRIRES is set equal to 1 if the officer attended
a Junior Resident JPME program. The reason for specifying
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JPME in this way was to account for whether the officer had
attended either the Senior or the Junior Resident JPME
program. This is not an option for officers appearing at
the 0-5 board. They would not yet have been eligible for
the Senior JPME program prior to selection for 0-5.
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Figure 3 . 2 Command & CAPT Recursive Model
Some of the variables that impact command screen are
also hypothesized to have an impact on selection to Captain,
and the direct effect of these variables is included in the
Captain model. The variable RAPPED5 is also included since
at the 0-6 board the officers will have 0-5 FITREPS. It is
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not included in the Command model because selection to 0-5
and command screening occur at approximately the same time.
Table 3.4 summarizes the variables used in the Command and
0-6 models and provides a brief description. The 0-6 model
is as follows:
PROMOTE = Jb + B12*RAPPED5 + B23*C0MMAND + B14*FFGE +
B15*JRIRES + B26*SRIRES + B17*JDA




AGE 01 Age in years at commissioning
MARRIED l=Married
0=Not married
APC1 0=College QPR of 3.60-4.0
l=College QPR of 3.20-3.59
2=College QPR of 2.60-3.19
3=College QPR of 2.20-2.59
4=College QPR of 1.90-2.19
5=College QPR of 0-1.89
RAPPED4 l=Recommended for Early Promotion as a LCDR
0=Not recommended for Early Promotion as a LCDR
RAPPED5 l=Recommended for Early Promotion as a CDR
0=Not recommended for Early Promotion as a CDR
FFUNDGE l=Received Fully-funded graduate education
0=Did not receive Fully-funded graduate education
JRIRES l=Received Junior Resident JPME education
0=Did not receive Junior Resident JPME education
SRIRES l=Received Senior Resident JPME education
0=Did not receive Senior Resident JPME education
JDA l=Filled billet from Joint Duty list
0=Did not fill billet from Joint Duty list
PIL l=Pilot
0=NFO
GOODDO l=Filled a "good" Division Officer billet
0=Did not fill a "good" Division Officer billet
GOODDH l=Filled a "good" Department Head billet
0=Did not fill a "good" Department Head billet
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C. METHODOLOGY
Logit models are used to analyze the impacts of FFGE
and JPME on promotion to 0-5, 0-6 and command screening.
This statistical method was chosen because the dependent
variable in all three models takes on a value of or 1.
The value of 1 means that the person was promoted or
selected for command; a value of indicates that the
individual was not selected or "passed over" for promotion
The data sets were analyzed using Statistical
Application Software (SAS) 26 at the Naval Postgraduate
School. The SAS system provided the means to collate and
sort the large data sets involved in the study and to
estimate the Logit model.
26
Statistical Applications Software Institute, Inc., Cary, NC
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
This chapter summarizes the results from the Logit
models for promotion to 0-5 (Figure 3.1), command screen and
promotion to 0-6 (Figure 3.2) . The interpretation of the
coefficients and the computation of the marginal effects
from the regression models will be discussed separately.
Those coefficients that achieve a 5% level of statistical
significance are judged to be significantly different from
zero in this study.
A. PARAMETER ESTIMATES AND DISCUSSION
1. Commander Logit Regression
The results from the separate regressions for the pre-
FY90 and post-FY90 periods are summarized in Table 4.1.
The results from these regressions show how these effects
have changed during this important transition time for the
U.S. Navy. The sign and significance of the parameter
estimates are easily interpreted. The values of the
parameter estimates can not be directly interpreted. This
interpretation will be accomplished using the "notional
person" technique in a later section.
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Table 4.1 Parameter Estimates for Commander Promotion Models
CDR LOGIT MODEL CDR LOGIT MODEL
PRE FY90 POST FY90
VARIABLES PARAMETER Pr > CHI-SQUARE PARAMETER Pr > CHI-SQUARE
INTERCEPT 2.1594 0.0027 2.5551 0.0077
MARRIED 0.4036 0.0063 0.464 0.0028
AGE01 -0.1302 0.0001 -0.1408 0.0001
APC1 -0.3049 0.0001 -0.1951 0.0007
FFUNDGE 0.3706 0.0072 -0.177 0.1789
RAPPED4 1.6197 0.0001 0.9925 0.1381
JRIRES 0.4524 0.0084 0.3848 0.0268
JDA -0.3407 0.0604 0.0602 0.7447
PIL 0.3232 0.0013 0.6558 0.0001
GOODDO 0.3767 0.0073 0.0174 0.8929
GOODDH -0.0629 0.7669 -0.1228 0.5243
The results from the models clearly indicate that the
impact of FFGE (FFUNDGE) has changed from the pre-FY90
period to the post-FY90 period. FFGE clearly had a positive
impact on performance and subsequent promotion to 0-5 in the
pre-FY90 period. The impact of FFGE on performance and
selection to 0-5 in the later period is not significant.
This echoes the warnings of some aviation community leaders
that superior performance is what promotion boards are using
to select officers for promotion. At the same time, it
should be appreciated that aviation community leaders only
recommended FFGE for those officers with good performance
records
.
Junior Resident JPME (JRIRES) impact on performance and
promotion shows that it is positive and significant in both
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periods. It is surprising that the value of JRIRES did not
increase between the periods due to the impact of Goldwater
-Nichols. It is also surprising that the utilization of
JPME or JDA was not significant in either period.
Apparently, JDA does not help promotion significantly but it
does not hurt either.
The positive and significant coefficients for the pilot
variable are a little more difficult to interpret. Pilots
are less likely to attend FFGE and more often receive JPME.
They are also more likely to be offered monetary incentives
or bonuses to stay in the Navy. These bonuses are more
often offered to pilots due to the hiring practices of the
airlines. Those pilots who feel that the Navy is not the
best job match for them due to average or poor FITREPs may
be more likely to leave the Navy than NFOs if the costs are
low enough. The higher promotion numbers may just be the
result of the relatively smaller pool of candidates for
promotion of pilots than for promotions of NFOs. The
drastically higher numbers for the post-FY90 era, therefore,
may just reflect the higher rate of airline hiring which
resulted in the Aviation Career Improvement Act (ACIA)
discussed in Chapter II. On the other hand, the promotion
boards may simply choose to promote pilots at a higher rate.
The 0-5 data set analysis in Chapter III shows that
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aviators attending FFGE are less often recommended for
accelerated promotion than the average aviator. They were
also less likely to have had good division officer and good
department head jobs than the average aviator. NFOs were
attending FFGE in higher percentages than pilots. Pilots
opted for JPME in higher percentages than NFOs. It is
important to consider these averages when reviewing the
results from the regression.
These percentages emphasize what has been discussed
earlier in this thesis. Those aviators with a better
history of performance are opting to stay operational. They
are taking the good division officer jobs at the FRS . They
are staying in operational flying billets and active in
their respective communities. Aviators, particularly
pilots, are more likely to receive education in the form of
JPME after they have completed their department head tours.
One explanation for NFOs receiving FFGE more often than
pilots is that there are fewer options for operational
flying billets on shore duty for NFOs. Pilots are used in
all the training squadrons including the squadron that
trains NFOs. They have billets in all primary, intermediate
and advanced training squadrons including all Fleet
Replacement Squadrons. NFOs only have flying billets in
their community FRS and the NFO training squadrons.
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2. Command Logit Regression
The command regression analysis examines all Commanders
that have stayed to the Captain selection board. The
billets held since making Commander were screened for billet
codes corresponding to the Commanding Officers (CO) billet
code. If a Commander had filled a CO billet then they had
successfully screened for command. There is one limitation
to this approach. This method of modeling command screen
does not capture those Commanding Officers that left the
Navy prior to the Captain selection board. Including those
who retire from the Navy, these numbers should be fairly
small. If this shortcoming in the analysis has any effect,
the impact of command screen on promotion to Captain will be
upwardly biased. That is to say that screening for command
may not have as large an effect on promoting to Captain as
the regression results indicate. This bias occurs because
those aviators successful enough to screen for command, but
opt to leave the Navy prior to the Captain selection board,
may leave because of below average or unsuccessful CO.
tours. Also, those not screened may be more likely to leave
the Navy. These aviators may have self-selected out of the
Navy.
The results of the Command Logit regression model are
illustrated in Table 4.2. The sign and significance of the
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parameter estimates are interpreted directly. The value of
the parameter estimates will be transformed using the
"notional person" technique in a later section. The results
of the Logit model show that the impact of FFGE is negative
in both periods and significant in the pre-FY90 period.
This negative impact on screening for command shows the
opportunity cost of leaving one's community. The negative
impact of FFGE has lessened in the post-FY90 period. This
may indicate that the navy is starting to value the
importance of FFGE more in today's smaller navy, a navy that
is going to need improved efficiency and effectiveness from
all it's personnel.
JRIRES is both positive and significant in the pre-FY90
model, perhaps indicating the effect of receiving education
when the opportunity cost is lowest. The JRIRES opportunity
occurs most often after the department head tour or after
the command tour. There are less shore duty operational
flying jobs for LCDRs or CDRs at these times. These more
senior aviators may have waited until later in their careers
to obtain more education because of this reason. Since the
beginning of the drawdown the impact of JRIRES is still
positive but no longer significant.
There also seems to be an opportunity cost associated
with JDA. It's impact on command screening is both negative
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and significant in both eras. The only way to explain why
this has not changed in the years since Goldwater-Nichols is
that remaining operational is most important in screening
for command. Taking the time to earn JPME and also utilizing
it in a joint duty assignment may have too much of an
opportunity cost. Attending JPME and having a JDA
effectively takes an officer out of their community for at
least four years.
The impact of being a pilot on command screen is
similar to that of pilots promoting to Commander, The
effect is both positive and significant. Again, this could
be interpreted as less successful pilots self-selecting out
of the Navy at a higher rate than less successful NFOs
.
This may be occurring due to the greater opportunities in




Table 4.2 Parameter Estimates for Command Screen Models
COMMAND LOGIT MODEL COMMAND LOGIT MODEL
PRE FY90 POST FY90
VARIABLES PARAMETER Pr > CHI-SQUARE PARAMETER Pr > CHI-SQUARE
INTERCEPT 1 .6969 0.2592 -0.4216 0.668
MARRIED 0.4605 0.1401 0.6505 0.0144
AGE01 -0.1425 0.0296 -0.0185 0.6539
APC1 0.043 0.6202 -0.1401 0.0416
FFUNDGE -0.4562 0.0387 -0.2643 0.1009
RAPPED4 0.9217 0.0001 0.0569 0.6599
JRIRES 0.8221 0.0003 0.2635 0.1471
JDA -1.8585 0.0001 -0.8117 0.0001
PIL 0.8688 0.0001 0.8142 0.0001
GOODDO -0.00147 0.9953 0.5091 0.0127
GOODDH 0.8715 0.0001 0.9248 0.0001
3. Captain Logit Regression
The Captain model attempts to estimate the effects of
those variables that directly influence promotion to
Captain. The results of the Captain models are shown in
Table 4.3. The results of the analysis shows that command
has the greatest impact on promoting to Captain. This makes
sense since Command is an important goal and opens the door
for later major command opportunities. Aviators who have
not had CO jobs will not be eligible for major commands and
follow-on selection to Admiral. Therefore command selection
has the largest impact on promotion to Captain. The COMMAND
variable is likely to include some bias. As indicated
above, some of the aviators who have had CO jobs have left
the Navy prior to the 0-6 board. They also may have self-
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selected out of the Navy due to sub-par performance as a CO.
This loss of Commanding Officers with weaker performance
will cause the COMMAND variable to be upwardly biased.
Those not selected for command may also be more likely to
leave
.
RAPPED5 is positive in both models and significant only
in the pre-FY90 model. This shows that those 0-5s who have
performed at a higher level are more often promoted. This
just reinforces what has been presented earlier. Other
things equal, superior performance is one of the most
important factors in getting promoted. There is also an
indirect effect on promotion to Captain as discussed above,
prior superior performance in operational jobs helps
successful aviators screen for COMMAND.
FFUNDGE, JRIRES, SRIRES and JDA are included in the
Captain models to see if these variables have any direct
effect on promotion to Captain. Recall from the command
model that these variables indirectly affect promotion to
Captain through their effect of command selection. None of
these parameter estimates is significant, the signs of the
coefficients, however, are worth noting. JDA is negative in
both models. Again, this may just reflect the large
opportunity cost of having two tours out of one's community.
It may indicate that officers that elect JDA may have chosen
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to leave their communities for the new challenges available
to them in the area of joint duty. FFUNDGE is negative in
the pre-FY90 model and positive in the later model.
The impact of JPME as explained by JRIRES is harder to
interpret. Goldwater-Nichols legislation should have
motivated the Navy to place more emphasis on JPME. JPME and
joint duty officer designation are now requirements for
selection to Admiral. However, these variables continue to
have no direct impact on promotion to Captain. JRIRES is
not significant and can be interpreted as having no impact
on promotion. Command selection and performance would then
be what is most important.
Table 4.3 Parameter Estimates for Captain Promotion Models
CAPTAIN LOGIT MODEL CAPTAIN LOGIT MODEL
PRE FY90 POST FY90
VARIABLES PARAMETER Pr > CHI-SQUARE PARAMETER Pr > CHI-SQUARE
INTERCEPT -4.2743 0.0001 -2.8662 0.0001
RAPPED5 1.3142 0.0001 0.0461 0.8163
COMMAND 5.8821 0.0001 4.5478 0.0001
FFUNDGE -0.2522 0.4617 0.1957 0.4201
JRIRES 0.3709 0.3164 -0.0645 0.8118
SRIRES 0.00359 0.9921 0.0505 0.8389
JDA -0.3366 0.4286 -0.0366 0.8701
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B. NOTIONAL PERSON MARGINAL EFFECTS INTERPRETATION
In order to directly interpret the results of a Logit
regression the parameter estimates must be converted to a
marginal effect. A "notional person" is created in which a
person was assigned a value of for all dummy variables in
the regression model. The value for continuous variables is
set to the mean of the data set. The probability of
promoting or screening is computed for this "notional
person". The probability of promoting or screening,
depending on which model was used, was then predicted by
varying the dummy variables one at a time from zero to one
and varying the continuous variables by one unit. The
difference between these two probabilities is the marginal
effect. This marginal effect allows us to examine the
numerical impact these variables have on the chances of
promoting or command selection.
1 . Commander Model
The marginal effects interpretation of the two CDR
models is very straight forward. Table 4.4 lists the
results of the marginal effects computations. Interpreting
the pre-FY90 results shows that being married increases an
aviators chance of promoting by 6.7%. Increasing the age of
an aviator at commissioning by one year causes a decreased
chance of promotion of 1.8% holding all other variables
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constant- A one unit increase in APC1 causes the chances
for promotion to decrease by 4%.
The variables of most interest in this study are
FFUNDGE and JRIRES. Attending FFUNDGE increases the chances
of promotions by 6%. Attending JRIRES increases the
probability of promotion by 6.8%. The opportunity cost of
using the joint education is indicated by the 4.9% decrease
in the probability of promoting if the aviator has a JDA.
Table 4.4 Marginal Effects for Commander Promotion Models
CDR MODEL
MARGINAL EFFECTS









GOODDH -1 .4% -2.2%
PIL 4.5% 14%
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2 . Command Model
The marginal effects of the command selection model in
Table 4.5 can be interpreted in the same way as the results
of the Commander promotion model.
Table 4.5 Marginal Effects for Command Selection Models
COMMAND MODEL
MARGINAL EFFECTS











3 . Captain Model
The marginal effects interpretation of the Captain
model is not as easy to interpret. The values of the
"notional person" calculations are shown in Table 4.6. The
value of the COMMAND variable may be positively biased due
to the possible self-selection out of the Navy by less
successful Commanding Officers. This was discussed earlier
in this chapter.
61
Table 4.6 Marginal Effects for Captain Promotion Models
CAPTAIN MODEL
MARGINAL EFFECTS







The large impact of the COMMAND variable leaves very
little explanatory room for the other variables in the
regression.
The education variables that were of particular
interest in this thesis are not directly significant and
have little or no impact on promotion to Captain. As shown
in Table 4.5, however, they do have an indirect effect on
promotion to Captain through their effect on command.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis was undertaken to measure the impact that
fully-funded graduate education and resident joint
professional military education has on an aviators career.
In particular, the impact on promotion to Commander (0-5)
,
Captain (0-6) and command selection is investigated.
To isolate the effect of performance on promotion, two
new proxies were developed. It is difficult to
differentiate performance under the old FITREP system due to
grade inflation. The aviation community places great
emphasis on certain jobs in a squadron and community. The
proxies for these good jobs were divided between good
division officer jobs (G00DD0) and good department head jobs
(GOODDH) . When used in conjunction with competitive
FITREPs, these variables provide an excellent measurement of
performance
.
The most surprising discovery from this analysis is the
high opportunity cost of a joint duty assignment (JDA) on
promotion to 0-5 and particularly command selection. JDA'
s
direct impact on promotion to 0-6 is not significant but it
is felt indirectly through command selection, the most
important factor in promoting to 0-6. The negative impact
of this variable is surprising because of the importance
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placed on JDA at aviation career briefs. While these briefs
always stress performance, they also include three other
important milestones as important for promotion. These
milestones are JDA, qualification as Officer of the Deck
(OOD) on the disassociated sea tour, and a Washington D.C.
tour
.
Another goal was to see if the impact of FFGE and JPME
has changed since the start of the downsizing. The results
show that the impact has changed. Successful promotion to
Commander now indicates a decreased emphasis on FFGE and
slightly more emphasis on JPME. Screening for command has
shown the opposite effects. FFGE' s impact has increased
while JPME's impact has decreased. The Captain promotion
model shows that FFGE and JPME have little or no direct
effect on promotion. The indirect effect, however, is seen
through the command model.
The third goal was to see if there was a difference in
the individual effects of having JPME or FFGE with those
individuals that may have both. To find out if the effect
of having both FFGE and JPME was different from the sum of
the effects of having either, an additional Logit regression
was performed. The results of these regressions indicate
that the value of this variable was not significant.
However, the number of individuals with both FFGE and JPME
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is fairly small.
B . RECOMMENDAT IONS
This thesis suggests that JDA does not positively
impact key measures of success in the Navy. The Goldwater-
Nichols legislation was the beginning of a change in the
military. The future military will rely more on joint
operations as downsizing continues to occur. The aviation
community needs to examine whether JDA is being given
appropriate emphasis in command selection.
The analysis of data in Chapter III reveals that those
aviators with FFGE were less often recommended for early
promotion. Officers do not receive competitive FITREPS
while attending FFGE. This causes a decreased opportunity
to receive a FITREP in which they can be recommended for
early promotion. Selection for FFGE is based on
professional performance, academic background and promotion
potential. While FFGE has firm selection requirements and
those selected for FFGE have lower APC scores (higher
undergraduate QPRs), there does not seem to be commensurate
translation into career success. The characteristics of the
aviators included in this study suggest that selection for
JPME has the most important impact on performance.
The data also suggests, however, that those selected
for FFGE may not be provided with the same opportunity to
65
attend JPME . This is supported by the small numbers of
individuals appearing before the 0-5 and 0-6 promotion
boards with both FFGE and JPME, and suggests that an aviator
has time for only one of these opportunities during a very
busy career. The results of the analysis indicate that
given a choice JPME provides greater rewards.
Aviation Captains hold many significant positions
outside operational command, for instance in the acquisition
community, the Navy staff and the Joint staff. FFGE should
be and is particularly helpful performing effectively in
these positions. Many policy issues addressed in these jobs
have a significant analytical component. Operational
experience combined with FFGE may be the best way to prepare
for these positions.
One recommendation is for the Navy to evaluate the hard
choices individuals are facing. If it is determined that
both FFGE and JPME are important, then opportunities for
FFGE, JPME and JDA should be increased.
Another recommendation is to conduct further research
using the "good jobs" concept. These jobs could be expanded
to include specific community jobs, Admiral's Aides jobs,
and any staff jobs of key value in the officer's community.
The impact of the other milestones, 00D qualification
and Washington, D.C. duty, on promotion and command
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selection. This type of analysis would provide a
quantitative indicator of what influences promotion the
most
.
Further breakdown of the aviation community into three
different components (tactical, helicopter and maritime)
would also better estimate which of these sub-communities
place the greatest emphasis on FFGE, JPME and utilization of
these educations. This breakdown when used in conjunction
with data using the new FITREP system should more accurately
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